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 TARIFFS AND TRUSTS IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED 
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Amanda Gregg, B.Phil 
University of Pittsburgh, 2009
 
This paper explores the connection between protective tariffs and market concentration in the 
late nineteenth century United States.  In particular, the paper investigates the effects of the 
McKinley Tariff of 1890 on American sugar refining and white lead production.  My 
investigation includes a review of contemporary economic thought and political platforms, short 
histories of both industries, and event studies on the American Sugar Refining Company and the 
National Lead Company for the passage of the McKinley Tariff. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
The late nineteenth century was a period of radical social, political, and economic 
change.  In this period, the United States transformed from a “largely agricultural, rural, isolated, 
localized, and traditional society to one that was becoming industrialized, urban, integrated, 
national, and modern.”1  In 1870, fifty-two percent of workers were engaged in agriculture, and 
there were only twenty-five cities in the United States with more than fifty thousand inhabitants.  
By 1900, however, non-agricultural labor represented sixty percent of the workforce, and 
seventy-five cities had populations of at least fifty-thousand.2 Meanwhile, industries 
consolidated and organized themselves in new ways. These economic giants took advantage of 
advances in “bureaucratic organization” and set and reached goals based on “rational, conscious, 
and measurable” standards.3  At the head of these increasingly complex businesses structures, 
“salaried managers replaced the small traditional family firm as the primary instrument for 
managing production and distribution.”4 The consequences of these changes, however, disturbed 
                                                 
1 Charles W. Calhoun, “Introduction.,” in The Gilded Age: Perspectives on the Origins of Modern America, 
Charles W. Calhoun, Ed. (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 1. 
2 Ibid., 2. 
3 Glenn Porter. “Industrialization and the Rise of Big Business,” in The Gilded Age: Perspectives on the 
Origins of Modern America. Charles W. Calhoun, Ed. (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 12. 
4 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business. (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press, 1977), 1. 
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a wide variety of social critics.  The “Gilded Age” of the late nineteenth century was a time of 
opulence and innovation but also growing ethnic, regional, and class-based conflict.5 
 Two economic issues debated at the national level in the late nineteenth century were the 
protective tariff supporting American industry and the increasing concentration of enterprises, 
especially in the form of trusts. With the passage of legislation such as the McKinley Tariff and 
the Sherman Antitrust Act, both of these issues was the focus of newspaper editorials, national 
debates, and presidential speeches.  By the turn of the twentieth century, consolidations often 
allowed firms to dominate their respective industries.  Between 1895 and 1904, for example, in 
sixty percent of consolidations a single firm seized control of 62.5 percent of its industry in terms 
of capitalization.6  In the sugar refining industry, for example, “the Sugar Trust, later 
incorporated as the American Sugar Refining Company (ASRC), formed in 1887 as a 
consolidation of 18 firms controlling 80% of the industry.”7  Meanwhile, the sugar industry was 
protected by a tariff of “1.25 cents a pound, or 0.5 of a cent a pound more than the average direct 
cost of refining sugar in the United States.”8 Many other industries, including the lead industry, 
similarly consolidated and enjoyed significant tariff protection. Hence, tariff protection and 
industry consolidation were two highly visible and controversial features of the American 
economic landscape at the end of the nineteenth century. 
While many believed the issues were unrelated, some observers connected the increasing 
concentration of American industry with the protective tariff in place at the time.  Henry 
Havemeyer, the first president of the Sugar Trust and later head of the American Sugar Refining 
                                                 
5 Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner. The Gilded Age: A Tale of Today. (Hartford: American 
Publishing Company, 1874).  Twain and Warner invented the term “Gilded Age” in this book.  
6 Eichner, Alfred S. The Emergence of Oligopoly: Sugar Refining as a Case Study. (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1969), 1. 
7 David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullin. “Testing Static Oligopoly Models: Conduct and Cost in the 
Sugar Industry, 1890-1914.” The RAND Journal of Economics (Vol. 29, No. 2, Summer, 1998), 358. 
8 Ibid., 95. 
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Company, brought attention to this connection when he testified before Congress in 1899, 
blaming their tariff legislation for the power of his monopolistic enterprise.  He claimed, 
The mother of all trusts is the customs tariff bill.  The existing bill (tariff of 1897) and the 
 preceding ones have been the occasion of the formation of all large trusts, inasmuch as 
 they provide for an inordinate protection to all the interests of the country, sugar refining 
 excepted.9 
 
Throughout the nineteenth century, Congress made numerous changes to the federal tariff 
schedule, but the McKinley Tariff of 1890 arrived at a crucial moment in the debate on tariffs 
and trusts.  Both the Sugar Trust and the National Lead Trust consolidated in the late 1880s, and 
President Cleveland signed the Sherman Antitrust Act in July of 1890.  In this climate, the debate 
on the connection between tariffs and trusts reached a high point.   
Few historians or economists have specifically devoted much attention to the connection 
between tariffs and industry consolidation in the Gilded Age, especially at the time of the 
passage of the McKinley Tariff Act.  For example, in his discussion of the McKinley Tariff Act, 
Edward Stanwood mentions offhand, “It was charged that the tariff created monopolies, to the 
detriment of consumers, and that it was the mother of ‘trusts’.”10 Richard Henry Bensel similarly 
notes in a footnote that one sixteenth of Democratic Party platforms at the end of the nineteenth 
century blame protective tariffs for the emergence of trusts, but he does not evaluate this claim in 
detail.11  Naomi Lamoreaux discusses the effects of protective tariffs for the Great Merger 
                                                 
9 H.R. Doc. No. 476, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., 1899-1900, 101, quoted in Richard Zerbe. “The American 
Sugar Refining Company, 1887-1914: The Story of a Monopoly.” Journal of Law and Economics (Vol. 12, No. 2, 
October 1969), 341. 
10 Edward Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Russell and 
Russell, 1903), 244. 
11 Richard Henry Bensel. The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 1877-1900.  (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 125n. 
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Movement of the late 1890s but does not discuss the formation of early consolidations including 
the Lead Trust and Sugar Trust.12  
This paper will explore the connection between tariffs and trusts in America in the 1890s 
by analyzing political points of view and contemporary economic theory and by examining how 
the McKinley Tariff act affected two industries in the late nineteenth century, American sugar 
refining and white lead production.  The first chapter will explore political platforms in the late 
nineteenth century, the second will discuss the views of economists, the third and fourth will 
present the sugar and lead case studies, and the final chapter includes an event study on the Sugar 
Trust and National Lead Trust for events related to the passage of the McKinley Tariff. 
I will argue that, for some politicians, arguments connecting trusts and tariffs were 
politically convenient because they united the concerns and prejudices of their voting 
constituencies.  Meanwhile, those economists who connected tariffs and trusts believed that 
tariffs allowed firms to raise prices, strengthening monopoly power.  In the end, though tariffs 
increased the profit margins of trusts already formed, tariffs were neither a necessary nor 
sufficient factor in the increasing concentration of industries at the end of the nineteenth century.   
Industrialists, including the leaders of the sugar and white lead industries, tried to consolidate 
their industries because they recognized the enormous profits available to companies who could 
eliminate both foreign and domestic competition and control the price and output of their 
industry’s product. 
The history of the sugar refining and lead industries demonstrates concretely how trusts 
took advantage of tariff protective but were not merely the product of tariffs.  Though the sugar 
                                                 
12 Naomi Lamoreaux. The Great Merger Movement in American Business, 1895-1904. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 97.  Lamoreaux argues that protective tariffs may have helped to stimulate the 
Great Merger Wave since protective tariffs raised company profits, which encouraged entry and greater competition. 
Industry leaders then tried to reduce this competition by merging with other firms.  
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refining industry in the nineteenth century enjoyed significant tariff protection, the nature and 
development of the industry itself favored larger firms and greater consolidation.  At the end of 
the nineteenth century, the sugar trust and the later American Sugar Refining Company emerged 
because its leaders recognized the enormous profits available to them if they could control the 
output of their product.  Similarly, the leaders of the American lead industry organized the 
National Lead Trust in the late nineteenth century to avoid domestic competition, but the 
company also benefited from tariff protection throughout the nineteenth century.   
Finally, the event study demonstrates that both the sugar and lead industries experienced 
abnormal positive returns for events related to the passage of the McKinley Tariff Act.  Even 
though both industries consolidated regardless of the existence of protective tariffs, these 
protective tariffs certainly benefited these industries. 
 5 
2.0  TARIFFS AND TRUSTS IN GILDED AGE POLITICS 
During the Gilded Age, Democrats and Republicans dominated national political 
discussion.  Thus, to examine the connection between tariffs and trusts, I will first explore the 
views of the major political parties in the late nineteenth century. In the 1890s, the Republican 
and Democratic Parties vigorously debated the emergence of trusts and the protective tariff 
supporting American industry.13  Often, their debate highlighted fundamental disagreements 
about the merits of protection and consolidation and about future of the American economy in 
general.   
In the late nineteenth century, the Republican and Democratic Parties laid the foundations 
for the trade policies that each party maintained essentially until the 1940s.  Though the Gilded 
Age is usually described as a period of political deadlock, the passage of the McKinley Tariff 
Act in 1890 “boldly proposed…a radical extension of the protective system.”14  Frank Taussig 
documents the equally radical reaction to this piece of legislation: “Immediately after the passage 
of the act, the party which had thus espoused the extreme protective policy suffered a crushing 
defeat.”15 In the November elections after the October passage of the McKinley Tariff, the 
                                                 
13 Populists and other minor parties of the time period do not take as clear a stand on the tariffs/trusts 
debate.  In their 1892 Omaha Platform, the Populists asserted their opposition to protective tariffs, a predictable 
position in light of their argrarian constituency and their usual liberal stances on economic issues.  (“People's Party 
Platform,'' Omaha Morning World-Herald , 5 July 1892, Paragraph 11).  However, there is no mention of a 
connection between tariffs and trusts. 
14 Frank W. Taussig.  The Tariff History of the United States. (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1931), 283. 
15 Ibid., 284. 
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“Republicans were defeated as they had never been defeated before,” and in the presidential 
election of 1892, the White House returned to Democratic control under President Grover 
Cleveland.16 The Republicans maintained their support for high-tariff, protectionist policies until 
the 1940s when the party began to support significant decreases in protective tariffs as part of the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934.17  
The section will explore the philosophies and strategies that served as the basis for the 
political drama at the end of the nineteenth century. Each party explored a separate set of 
principles and often tailored its platforms to suit the attitudes and desires of specific groups of 
voters.  The major parties exploited geographic, class, religious, and ethnic divisions. 
 
2.1 DEMOCRATIC PARTY PLATFORMS 
For the Democratic Party in the late nineteenth century, both tariffs and trusts represented 
major issues.  The Democrats opposed tariff protective and trust formation on democratic 
principle: they believed that both institutions favored certain sectors of society, specifically 
Eastern industrial interests.  The Democratic Party’s geographic and cultural constituencies may 
explain the party’s stances on these issues and why connecting tariffs and trusts united the 
concerns of these groups. 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 Douglas A. Irwin and Randall S. Kroszner.  “Interests, Institutions, and Ideology in Securing Policy 
Change: The Republican Conversion to Trade Liberalization After Smoot-Hawley.” (Journal of Law and 
Economics, Vol. 42. No. 2, October 1999), 643.  Irwin and Kroszner argue that Republicans switched sides only as a 
result of a combination of greater export opportunities and significant “institutional change that strengthened 
exporters’ lobbying” positions.” 
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The Democratic Party exploited opposition to the protective tariff and to large 
concentrations of wealth in order to unite its voting bloc.  For members of the Democratic Party, 
the tariff was “the object of unmitigated hostility;” this issue “never provoked a party split.”18 To 
demonstrate the prominence of the tariff issue, Richard Henry Bensel ranks the relative 
frequency of the appearance of issues in Democratic and Republican Party platforms.  According 
to this measure, the tariff was the number one issue for the Democratic Party in from 1877 to 
1896 and the number 4 issue from 1897 to 1900, an overall rank first place relative frequency.19  
In addition to the protective tariff, the topic of industry consolidation also dominated Democratic 
Party platforms. The issue of trust formation ranks fourth in Democratic Party platforms between 
1897 and 1900 and ranks tenth overall between 1877 and 1900.20  The text of the political 
platforms themselves reveals not only the Democratic Party’s stances towards tariffs and trusts 
but also provides some clues about why these issues were so divisive. 
Democrats argued that the tariff provided inequitable protection and raised the price of 
raw materials and manufactured goods.  The 1892 Democratic Party Platform denounced the 
protective tariff as the “culminating atrocity of class legislation,” arguing that the tariff was 
disproportionately helpful to powerful business.21  The Democrats, then, wanted to reduce tariff 
“in the direction of free raw materials and cheaper manufactured goods.”22  Throughout, the 
Democratic Party argued that the tariff was inequitable because it provided an unfair advantage 
to a few while hurting many.  Indeed, the Democrats argued that the tariff disproportionately 
helped some geographic regions.  Tariff protection benefited those regions that held protected 
                                                 
18 Bensel. The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 107. 
19 Ibid., 186. 
20 Ibid., 186. 
21 “Political Party Platforms: Democratic Party Platform of 1892.”  
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29585 (accessed April 12, 2009), paragraph 5.  All presidential 
platforms are listed in the bibliography under Gerhard Peters, “The American Presidency Project.” 
22 Ibid., paragraph 5. 
 8 
industries and was thus very helpful to industrialization in the north.23 Meanwhile, farmers of the 
West and South were “forced to buy manufactured goods in a protected domestic market while 
receiving prices set by an openly competitive world market.”24 Thus, in 1896, the Democratic 
Party Platform stated that, if there must be a tariff, it at least must be “honestly and economically 
administered” and “not discriminate between class or section.”25 According to Bensel, “early in 
this period, Democrats often clothed their opposition to protection as a demand for equitable 
markets.”26  Similarly, Democrats detected increasing economic inequality among the classes in 
society when they attacked emerging trusts. 
The Democratic Party connected protective tariffs and trusts, arguing that tariffs gave 
trusts an unfair advantage and thus increased the wealth of a few already rich industrialists.  
According to the Democrats, the protective tariff “proved a public breeder of trusts and 
monopolies” and “enriched the few at the expense of the many .”27  Thus, at the national level, 
the Democratic Party connected the emergence of trusts with the protective tariff amidst its 
argument against the protective tariff in general. By the end of the nineteenth century, the 
connection between tariffs and trusts emerged as its own issue in Democratic and Republican 
Party platforms.  Between 1897 and 1900, the issues of tariffs and trusts were the tenth most 
frequently mentioned national party plank.28  
Why did the Democratic Party express so much concern about tariffs and trusts? Joanne 
Reitano argues that Democrats argued for greater equality in society because they in fact 
represented nascent social reformers in the spirit of the Progressive Era.  The Democratic tariff 
                                                 
23 Bensel, The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 465. 
24 Ibid., 464. 
25 “Political Party Platforms: Democratic Party Platform of 1896.” 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29586 (accessed April 12, 2009), paragraph 11. 
26 Bensel. The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 125. 
27 “Democratic Party Platform of 1896,” paragraph 11. 
28 Bensel, The Political Economy of American Industrialization., 186. 
 9 
reformers based their argument against the tariff on the principle that “the protective tariff did 
not meet legitimate government needs and therefore seemed to serve illegitimate ends.”29 These 
tariff reformers argued from a foundation of “both political and economic theory,” basing their 
arguments on principles of “limited taxation, equal treatment before the law, and majority 
rule.”30 Thus, Democrats believed that the tariff protected certain segments of the American 
population and thus contradicted fundamental American values.   
The Democratic Party, on the other hand, did not merely argue that tariffs and trusts 
benefited the few at the expense of the many.  Instead, Democratic politicians worried that tariffs 
and trusts benefited certain economic groups like Eastern industrialists over others, for example 
Western farmers.  Historian Robert W. Cherny even argues that, at least at the state level, 
Democrats and Republicans tried to choose a ticket that represented a balance of “the major 
regions within the state” and “major economic and professional groups.”31  In other words, there 
is some evidence that at this time the Democratic and Republican Parties actively developed 
strategies to capture certain groups.  In any case, “cultural and religious ideas…affected party 
allegiances among the voters” at the end of the nineteenth century.32 
Both the Democratic and Republican Parties attracted voting constituencies based on 
geography, ethnicity, religion, profession, and other characteristics. In the late nineteenth 
century, the Democratic Party still captured many votes from Southern whites, by presenting 
                                                 
29 Joanne R. Reitano. The Tariff Question: The Great Debate of 1888. (University Park: The Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1994), 34. 
30 Ibid. 44. 
31 Robert W. Cherny, American Politics in the Gilded Age: 1868-1900 (Wheeling, Illinois; Harlan 
Davidson, 1997), 10. 
32 Charles W. Calhoun. “Party Conflict: Republicans versus Democrats, 1877-1901.” The Gilded Age: 
Perspectives on the Origins of Modern America. Charles W. Calhoun, Ed. (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 
266. 
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“themselves as the party of white supremacy.”33  Workers in big cities usually supported the 
Democratic Party since workers usually supported their local machine and “more big-city 
organizations were Democratic than Republican.”34  Additionally, the Democratic Party held 
strong allegiances among Catholics, and “during the Gilded Age, northern Catholics voted 
Democratic by margins of 70-30 or more.”35  Thus, often particular Democratic platform planks 
were an attempt to capture votes from Southern whites, urban workers, or Catholics, groups that 
resented what they perceived to be special advantages granted to increasingly concentrated 
Eastern industries.  For these voters, tariffs and trusts represented institutions of inequality. 
2.2 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORMS 
While the Democratic Party emphasized equality, the Republican Party argued in favor of 
the protective tariff supporting American industry believing that tariff protection could help the 
American economy in its competition with other economies around the world.  Similarly to the 
case of the Democratic Party, the tariff united the Republican Party and for many Republicans 
was an “unshakable pillar of party identity for the Republicans.”36  Also like Democratic Party 
platforms, tariffs ranked first in relative frequency from 1877 to 1896 in Republican platforms 
and third from 1897-1900, also an overall first place relative frequency.37  The tariff was the 
major unifying issue for the Republican Party in the late nineteenth century. 
                                                 
33 Cherny, American Politics in the Gilded Age., 27. 
34Ibid., 29. 
35 Ibid., 27. 
36 Bensel, The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 107. 
37 Ibid., 184. 
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Their stance on the tariff issue revealed the pro-business stance of Republican politicians. 
Republicans promoted the protective tariff for American industry, believing that foreign 
competition could destroy American businesses.  The Republican Party Platform stated that 
Republicans were “uncompromisingly in favor of the American system of protection” and hence 
opposed “its destruction as proposed by [President Cleveland] and his party.”38  According to the 
Republicans, by opposing the tariff Democrats served “the interests of Europe” while 
Republicans supported “the interests of America.”39 While the 1892 and 1896 Republican Party 
Platforms briefly reiterated their support for the tariff, the 1896 platform added detail.40  This 
time, Republicans expressed concern for American workers, arguing that foreign competition 
with American businesses will force American businesses to compensate for lower prices by 
reducing wages.  According to Republicans, a protective tariff would “protect American labor 
from degradation and the wage level of other lands.”41  In each of these arguments in support of 
the tariff, Republicans asserted that foreign competition would be harmful to the American 
economy. 
  The Republican Party only occasionally addressed the topic of trust formation. When 
Republicans did mention trusts, they never defended them. In Republican platforms, the issue of 
trust formation is the fourth most common party plank between 1897 and 1900 and the tenth 
most common overall.42 Though trust formation did not rank as highly as the tariff in national 
party platforms, the trust was somewhat prominent in state party platforms.  In its earlier party 
                                                 
38 “Political Party Platforms: Republican Party Platform of 1888.” 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29627 (accessed April 12, 2009), paragraph 4. 
39 Ibid. 
40 “Political Party Platforms: Republican Party Platform of 1892. 
“http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29628 (accessed April 12, 2009), paragraph 2. 
41 “Political Party Platforms: Republican Party Platform of 1896.” 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29629 (accessed April 12, 2009), paragraph 3. 
42 Bensel, The Political Economy of American Industrialization,184. 
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platforms of the late 1880s and early 1890s, however, the Republican Party completely evaded 
the subject of trusts.  On the state level, moreover, the Republican Party never defended trust 
formation.  In fact, neither Republicans nor Democrats “ever adopted a plank defending either 
trusts or industrial consolidation; given the intense public hostility to trusts, public defenders 
were few and far between.”43  Republicans, therefore, generally avoided the topic of trust 
formation in public debate. 
There is some debate about the success of these Republican Party platforms.  Reitano 
argues that the Republican program was “confessedly protective.”44 According to Republican 
platforms, the government should adjust tariff rates “to give encouragement to American 
enterprise, investment to American capital, and employment to American labor.”45 In the 
nineteenth century, such an economic development program appeared plainly to favor certain 
segments of American society.  On the issue of emerging monopolies, however, Reitano argues 
that while Democrats opposed the concentration of enormous wealth in the hands of a powerful 
few, Republican’s “tone was defensive.”46  Rather than propose their own solution to the 
possible problem posed by emerging monopolies, Republicans claimed that “combination was 
not inherently evil” and that ‘the large corporation was nothing but a reflection of quantitative 
and qualitative improvements in production methods.”47 According to Reitano, therefore, the 
Republican argument was a mere reaction to the free-market views of the Democratic Party.48 
Bensel, however, argues that the Republican Party’s views were more than a mere 
reaction to those of the Democratic Party.  The Republican Party, he argues, was a 
                                                 
43 Ibid., 122. 
44 Reitano, The Tariff Question, 46. 
45 Ibid., 46. 
46 Ibid., 73. 
47 Ibid., 73. 
48 Thus Reitano argues, somewhat in contrast to Bensel, that the protectionists forwarded a less developed 
argument than their Democratic reformer peers.    
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“developmental agent mediating between democratic claims and the operating requirements of 
capital investment” and was hence responsible for the coexistence of democracy and 
development in the United States in the late nineteenth century.49  According to Bensel, the 
Republican Party supported industrialization with three policies: “tariff protection for industry, 
adherence to the international gold standard, and an unregulated national market for labor and 
production.”50  The international gold standard, while developmentally neutral, allowed the 
Republican Party to solidify its political base.  From that base, they instituted a protective tariff 
to support American industry and constructed an unregulated national market.51  In other words, 
Republican developmental policy formed an American economy free to develop domestically 
without worrying about economic threats from outside its borders. 
On the other hand, Republican Party platforms, like Democratic Party platforms, 
represented an attempt to court certain sectors of the voting public.  While the Democratic Party 
maintained political strongholds in the South and West, the Republicans concentrated on the 
North and “held regional bases in New England, upstate New York, Pennsylvania, and the upper 
Midwest.”52  The gold standard, for example, was a major element of Gilded Age Republican 
Party policy and “heavily favored the industrial East over the capital-importing West and 
South.”53  Additionally, voters often identified with the Republican Party based on their religion 
or ethnicity.  In particular, “old-stock New Englanders – those whose families had lived in the 
United States for several generations – and their descendants across the middle Atlantic and 
                                                 
 49Bensel, The Political Economy of American Industrialization, xviii. 
50 Ibid. 
51Ibid., 516. 
52 Ibid., 28. 
53 Bensel, The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 355. 
 14 
Midwestern states were among the strongest Republicans.”54  These New Englanders, often the 
northern industrialists of the nineteenth century, thus represented an influential constituency 
within the Republican Party and swayed the party’s views on tariffs and trusts.  
2.3 CONCLUSIONS 
In the end, the political platforms of the major parties in the nineteenth century reflected 
national concern with economic development, especially with the issues of the tariff and 
emerging monopolies.  According to Richard Franklin Bensel, “economic development 
dominated national party platforms in the late nineteenth century.”55  For example, the 
emergence of trusts is significant in the history of American politics because it allowed the 
Republican and Democratic parties to address major issues of economic development on a level 
comprehensible to a large portion of the electorate.   Party platforms about the relative merits of 
antitrust legislation “directly addressed the consolidation of the national market.”56   
In sum, the major parties approached the issues of tariffs and trusts in harmony with their 
general philosophical leanings and respective constituencies.  Similarly, the Democrats 
connected tariffs and trusts out of general suspicion of northern industrialization.  In other words, 
Democrats witnessed the increasing concentration of business and the existence of a protective 
tariff that disproportionately helped northern industrialization and the wealthy industrialists in 
control.  Republican platforms, meanwhile, appeased northern industrialists, since Republicans 
denied the connection between the two policies or denied that trusts were in fact a problem.  
                                                 
54 Cherny, American Politics in the Gilded Age, 28. 
55 Bensel. The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 102. 
56 Ibid., 121. 
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Thus, each party’s stance towards the connection between tariffs and trusts follows logically 
from each party’s stance on the individual issues and from the views of each party’s voting bloc. 
 
 16 
3.0  THE VIEWS OF CONTEMPORARY ECONOMISTS 
Economists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries debated the relationship 
between tariffs and trusts in considerable depth.  In this section, I will analyze the writings of 
economists Henry B. Gardner, James E. Hagerty, Albert Clarke, Frank L. McVey, and Albert C. 
Whitaker. These economists can be divided into three major groups. First, Henry B. Gardner and 
James E. Hagerty believed that tariffs supported trusts by allowing the trusts to continue to raise 
already high prices.  Second, protectionist Albert Clarke argued that tariffs could not increase the 
power of trusts to raise prices, that some trusts could be both hurt and helped by tariffs, and that 
tariffs could not discourage domestic competition.  Finally, Frank L. McVey, Albert C. 
Whitaker, and Albert Clarke pointed out that tariffs existed long before trusts and that trusts 
existed in unprotected industries. These arguments, outlined below, provide interesting examples 
of contemporary economic writings.  In general, those who deny a connection between tariffs 
and trusts voice arguments that agree with modern economic theory. 
Henry B. Gardner, professor of political economy at Brown University, and James E. 
Hagerty, professor of sociology at Ohio State University, believed that tariffs could create or at 
least increase the power of emerging monopolies.  These economists were especially concerned 
with the ability of monopolies to control prices. In 1906 Gardner, for example, stated that tariffs 
did not create the trusts but that tariffs certainly increased “the power of the trust to control 
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prices.”57  Hagerty agreed that tariffs helped monopolies to control prices and wrote in 1906 that 
since “the determination of price is the fundamental thing in monopoly,”58 there must be some 
“definite causal relation between high tariffs and the power of some American trusts.”59  These 
economists, in other words, believed that the tariff, which was observed to raise the prices of 
some commodities, must increase the ability of a big company to raise prices for profit.  There 
were, however, several writers who disagreed with this line of reasoning. 
Many economists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did not believe that 
there existed a connected between tariffs and trusts.  Col. Albert Clarke, a vehement supporter of 
tariff protection and secretary of the Home Market Club, for example, disagreed with the 
connection made by other economists between high prices caused by the tariff and increased 
monopoly power over prices.60  In 1906 Clarke stated, in agreement with modern economic 
theory, that “high prices are not caused by duties, but by the law of demand and supply.”61  This 
is somewhat consistent with a contemporary understanding of industrial organization economics. 
Although a monopoly can “recognize its influence over the market price” and “choose that level 
of price and output that [maximizes] its overall profits,” “the monopoly will be able to sell only 
what the market will bear.”62  In other words, the power exercised by monopolies like trusts is 
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not limitless; eventually, consumers will find a substitute for a product or simply learn to live 
without it. 
Frank L. McVey, professor of economics at the University of Minnesota from 1896 to 
1907, wondered whether tariffs could help trusts at all.  Many monopolies faced increased prices 
on raw materials imported from abroad because of protective tariffs.63 The Sugar Trust, for 
example, may have benefited from tariff protection because the firm was protected from foreign 
competition.  However, the Sugar Trust also imported its raw sugar from abroad (primarily from 
Cuba) and therefore may have benefited from a reduction in the tariff and hence a reduction in 
raw materials costs.  According to Frank L. McVey, trusts or monopolies like “the American 
Sugar Refining Company and the American Tobacco Company would look with favor upon a 
reduction in the tariff upon raw material, knowing that their combinations were sufficient to 
protect them against any foreign competition in refined sugars.”64   
Additionally, Clarke and Professor Albert C. Whitaker pointed out that tariff protection 
was available to all domestic firms in a certain industry.  Thus, the tariff helped monopolists no 
more than it helped potential competitors.  Whitaker, professor of economics at Stanford 
University, in 1906 wrote, “Tariff protection is open equally to all home producers.”65  In this 
vein, Albert Clarke noted that one of the greatest effects of the tariff was “to promote domestic 
competition.”66  Each of these economists doubted that tariffs protected monopolies from foreign 
competition or gave these monopolies more freedom to control prices, the essential features of 
the argument connecting tariffs and trusts.   
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 Furthermore, tariff supporters like Albert Clarke discounted the causal connection 
between tariff protection and monopoly formation.   If tariffs were really the necessary 
ingredient for trust formation, trusts should have emerged with the passing of tariff protection.  
According to Clarke, for example, “protection existed [in the United States] a century before any 
trusts were formed.”67  In addition, they argued that trusts existed in many unprotected 
industries, indicating that the existence of protective tariffs was in fact not a necessary condition 
for the emergence of monopolies. According to historian Joanne Reitano, those economists 
aligned with Republican Party philosophy, for example, often argued that “trusts existed in 
unprotected industries as well, such as cottonseed oil.”68  In other words, if tariffs were such a 
vital ingredient in the formation of monopolies, then few monopolies should form without tariff 
protection.  In reality, according to these economists, trusts formed in many industries that did 
not benefit from tariff protection.  Thus, this group of economist argued that, if tariffs were really 
the proximate cause for trusts, trust formation should often accompany high protective tariffs.  
They concluded, therefore, that the argument connecting tariffs and trusts was logically flawed. 
In the cases of the sugar and lead industries, tariffs existed long before trusts formed, the 
market limited increases prices, and tariff protection was available to all domestic firms in the 
industry.  In other words, these examples vindicate the views of economists like Albert Clarke 
and Albert C. Whitaker.  Case studies of the Sugar Trust and the National Lead Trust are 
outlined in the next chapters. 
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4.0  A BRIEF HISTORY OF AMERICAN SUGAR REFINING 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the price of sugar affected the daily lives of almost 
every American, and the American Sugar Refining Company controlled most of the refined 
sugar industry, a notorious example of industry consolidation.  Meanwhile, the American Sugar 
Refining Company and the earlier Sugar Trust experienced extensive tariff protection.  As 
outlined above, several economists and politicians connected the two prominent features of this 
industry, tariff protection and market concentration.  As mentioned in the introduction, even the 
sugar industry’s de facto leader, Henry Havemeyer, posited that tariffs “are the mother of 
trusts.”69  By examining the sugar industry provides, we can explore the connection between 
protective tariffs and emerging monopolies. 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the sugar industry, like many industries in 
this time, experienced a rapid consolidation.  According to Richard Zerbe, “between 1867 and 
1887… there was a striking decline in the number of firms engaged in sugar refining from about 
52 to 24.”70  Meanwhile, the average plant size greatly increased, and the average sugar firm 
increased its daily production “from about 200 to about 1,000 barrels per day.”71 In 1887, leaders 
of the sugar industry gave birth to the Sugar Trust, “a consolidation of 18 firms controlling 80% 
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of the industry.”72  Its successor, the American Sugar Refining Company, controlled 95% of 
industry capacity by 1892.73  Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, a few powerful 
industrialists controlled the entire American sugar refining industry. 
Meanwhile, the sugar industry enjoyed a substantial protective tariff in the nineteenth 
century.  By 1890 the sugar industry was protected by a tariff of “1.25 cents a pound, or 0.5 of a 
cent a pound more than the average direct cost of refining sugar in the United States.”74  In fact, 
in 1887, the tariff on refined sugar stood at eighty-nine percent of the price of sugar.75  Imported 
refined sugar, therefore, was 1.89 times as expensive as domestically refined sugar, a huge price 
advantage for domestic sugar refiners.   
Tariff protection represented a key ingredient in the success of sugar refineries in the 
United States in the nineteenth century.  Economists and politicians wondered whether tariff 
protection was also the key ingredient in the consolidation of the nineteenth century sugar 
industry.  However, although tariff protection helped domestic sugar refining become extremely 
profitable, the nature and development of the sugar industry itself explains why sugar refining 
became such a concentrated industry in the nineteenth century.  The sugar industry consolidated 
in the late nineteenth century simply to increase profits.   
Larger sugar refiners tended to be more successful than smaller firms for several reasons.  
First, starting a sugar refining operation required enormous capital because sugar refining was a 
multistep, complex procedure requiring lots of equipment.  To refine sugar, one must first cut, 
crush, or mash sugar cane in order to extract its liquid.  Then, this liquid must be boiled in large 
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vats at very specific temperatures until sugar crystallizes on the surface of the liquid.76  This 
entire process, therefore, required machines to mash or cut the cane, large vats to boil the mash, 
and a number of devices for extracting the concentrated sugar crystals.  Because the industry 
required lots of equipment, the industry favored the emergence of a few large firms rather than 
many small firms. 
The complex nature of sugar processing highlights another source of high startup costs: 
labor.  A successful sugar refinery required a specialist who knew exactly when and at which 
temperatures to start and stop this crystallization process.  Many early sugar refiners found that 
their best option for acquiring this kind of skilled labor was to import skill from abroad, 
especially from England.77  In fact, two of the skilled sugar men who came to America this way 
were William and Frederick Havemeyer, progenitors of the family that was to play so important 
a role in the history of the American sugar refining industry.”78  This skilled labor requirement 
represented a challenging start-up requirement for a sugar refinery, decreasing possibilities for 
entry and further favoring the emergence of a few large firms. 
Also, given the complex nature of the sugar refining process, any firm that could secure 
even a small technological advantage gained a significant advantage over competitors, 
sometimes enough to drive these competitors out of business.  As early as 1830, for example, 
new filtration technology using a substance called bone black, a charcoal made from animal 
bones, gave some firms a significant advantage over others.79  Those firms that could secure 
such new technologies remained in the industry while others exited. 
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Sometimes, a sugar refinery could secure a significant advantage over its competitors 
from the beginning by securing a favorable plant location.  Because the Civil War devastated the 
Louisiana sugar crop, by 1872, foreign imports of raw sugar accounted for “over 90 per cent of 
domestic consumption.”80  Therefore, plants located on coastlines could save on the cost of 
transporting the necessary imported raw sugar to their plants.  The Havemeyers benefited from 
their advantageous plant location near New York City.  When “the elder Havemeyer” built a new 
refinery on the East River in Williamsburg, “it had been recognized that a waterfront site offered 
certain cost advantage over a location in the heart of Manhattan” because, according to one 
refiner, “The difference in transportation, lighterage, warehousing, and housing expenses alone is 
sufficient to pay a dividend.”81  Thus, this geographic advantage could be very helpful to those 
firms who could locate themselves on a waterfront. 
In the period after the Civil War, the sugar industry in the United States behaved very 
much like a perfectly competitive industry.  According to economics textbooks, perfectly (or 
purely) competitive industries, a consumer’s utopia, have several identifying characteristics.  
First, these industries produce a homogenous product; they do not compete with one another on 
the quality of their product.  Second, in an ideal perfectly competitive industry, there are many –  
infinitely many – identical firms in the industry. Third and most significantly, these firms have 
no control over the prices they set for their product.  Instead, they set their prices based on the 
equilibrium of supply and demand in the market.82  However, for the sugar industry, this 
perfectly competitive status was inherently unstable, leading to later market concentration.   
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 In the post-Civil War period, the sugar industry satisfied many of the requirements for 
perfect competition.  Around the Civil War, new technologies in the sugar industry ensured that, 
for those firms that survived, sugar was a homogenous product.83  There is also considerable 
evidence that firms acted as price-takers rather than price-setters; there was a known market 
price for sugar, and those firms that followed the market price survived.84  However, according 
to Alfred Eichner, this near-perfectly competitive arrangement could not last permanently.  
Because competition forces firms that cannot follow the market price out of business, the sugar 
industry after the Civil War “was going through a series of convulsions which seemed to suggest 
that a competitive industry was inherently unstable, for the convulsions were themselves the 
product of the same competitive character.”85  John E. Searles, secretary and treasurer of the 
American Sugar Refining Company, later described this period as one of “survival of the 
fittest.”86 In fact, this competitive period itself increased the concentration of the sugar industry, 
since “given the large fixed investment required in sugar refining…all but the one or two leading 
firms found themselves no longer able to cover their full costs.”87 After the Civil War the sugar 
industry suffered under competitive instability and searched for a more stable, profitable 
arrangement. 
 From approximately 1870 to 1887, sugar refiners desperately searched for some way to 
collude, change tariff legislation, or otherwise drive costs down and prices up in order to survive.  
These attempts, however, were unsuccessful, leading industry leaders later to explore the trust 
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form of consolidation.88 Several firms tried unsuccessfully to convince legislators to change 
tariff rates in order to secure an advantage for small and medium-sized enterprises.89  Some 
small refiners even tried to exploit their connections with powerful bankers to ruin their 
competitors’ credit.  However, this scheme had an unfortunate side effect for the small refiners: 
the major refineries began importing sugar “for their own account,” cutting out a middle man, 
reducing costs, and securing another cost advantage over their small competitors.90 In 1882, 
many firms, including the larger enterprises, tried to form a cartel to reduce production and 
hence increase prices.91  However, because such cartels were not enforceable by any legal 
agreement, all firms had incentives to cheat, and the cartel quickly collapsed.  After the failure of 
these attempts at securing profitable stability, sugar firms searched for permanent, cooperative 
solutions. 
In the late 1880s, Henry Havemeyer led the movement to formally consolidate the sugar 
industry.  Havemeyer and his associates, the parents of the Sugar Trust, hired lawyer John R. 
Dos Passos92 to advise them on how best to consolidate their industry.  He advised them to form 
a trust rather than one big corporation since a trust would not be “open to public scrutiny.”93 The 
trust form consolidated the sugar industry by seizing control of a smaller firm, incorporating the 
firm and assigning “its stock to a board of trustees, and, in lieu of stock, to issue trust 
certificates.”94  The trust form increased the power of the parent companies since “the voting 
power stayed with the stock and hence with the trustees, but the earning power was represented 
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by the certificates, held chiefly by the original owners of the refineries.”95 In other words, 
owners of smaller refineries gave up control of their firms in exchange for enormous profits, a 
powerful incentive. 
This trust formation was indeed extremely profitable.  Though the trust did not attempt to 
control prices directly, “the board of trustees very definitely did attempt to control physical 
quantities.”96  Since the trust had such a considerable control over the supply of sugar, restricting 
quantity allowed them to increase the market price.  (This is, in fact, exactly the way the OPEC 
oil cartel controls world oil prices today.97)  For the sugar trust, restriction of output was in the 
end a successful strategy.  According to Eichner, “in the five years that followed the formation of 
the trust, the average margin was 1.01 cents a pound, an increase of 18 per cent,” which resulted 
in “a surplus which in 1891 amounted to $7 million.”98  These profits, the result of consolidation 
alone, were the primary incentive for the trust’s formation. 
The case of sugar refining suggests that protective tariffs did not stimulate market 
concentration in the nineteenth century.  Instead, industry leaders recognized that great profit 
margins were available to any industry that could unite its members and restrict production.  For 
example, George Moller of the North River Sugar Refining Company remarked, “We all knew 
that the only way to make sugar refining pay was to stop over-production.”99  Havemeyer 
similarly recognized the profit possibilities available from industry consolidation, “comparing 
the advantages of monopoly with those of oligopoly, and he found the former much more 
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attractive.”100  Richard Zerbe summarizes the story of the sugar monopoly aptly, arguing that 
“the proximate reason for the sugar monopoly was that at that time its formation was both 
profitable and possible.”101 
 In the case of the sugar trust, the profits available through concentration, not a protective 
tariff, stimulated industry concentration.  The case of the whiskey ring, on the other hand, 
demonstrates exactly what kind of protective tariff or tax break would have to be in place to 
encourage the formation of monopolies.  The whiskey ring operated for four years immediately 
after the Civil War.  In an ingenious scheme, “with the connivance of Federal agents, certain 
favored distillers were able to avoid paying the seventy-five-cents-a-gallon excise tax on at least 
50 per cent of the whiskey they produced, half the money saved going to the distillers themselves 
and half to the leading Republican politicians who had organized the scheme.”102 These favored 
distillers secured such a cost advantage that potential competitors were forced out of the 
industry, consolidating the whiskey ring as a single price-setting entity.   
 At first glance, the case of the whiskey ring appears to be a counterexample to the case of 
the sugar trust.  However, during this period in the whiskey industry, certain producers secured 
an advantage over other producers.  Later, in the late 1887, after several of these kinds of pools 
arose and failed, distillers formed a consolidation known as the Distillers and Cattle Feeders 
Trust.103  At the time that this true trust formed, the whiskey industry did not benefit from any 
kind of protective tariff.  Similarly, in the case of sugar refining, all firms benefited from the 
same protective tariffs situation; there were no favored producers.  During the formation of the 
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sugar trust and later the American Sugar Refining Company, the protective tariff did not give the 
trust any advantage over other domestic producers. To generalize, for a protective tariff or tax 
policy to stimulate the emergence of trusts, that policy must give certain members of an industry 
an advantage over not just foreign competition but domestic competition as well.  Trusts can 
only reap enormous monopoly profits by removing all possible competition. 
After its initial formation and first wave of profits, the Sugar Trust made a few changes in 
its organization to secure its position for the long term.  None of these changes considered the 
existence of a protective tariff.  The first major change in the trust’s organization was a reaction 
to the outcome of the North River Refining Case in 1890.  The case ruled that the Sugar Trust 
was an illegal combination according to the laws of the state of New York.  In reaction, the trust 
altered its structure and became the American Sugar Refining Company (ASRC), a holding 
company incorporated in New Jersey in order to avoid prosecution.104  The company controlled 
an overwhelming share of refined sugar production and in 1892 controlled as much as ninety-one 
percent of the industry (See Appendix B). The federal government attacked the ASRC in court, 
charging that the new organization was still a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.  However, 
when the United States Supreme Court heard the E.C. Knight case, the court ruled that the ASRC 
did not violate the law.  Since the E.C. Knight case was one of the first attempted prosecutions 
using the Sherman Act, the case “seemed to strike down the antitrust law itself.”105 With this 
decision in the Knight case, the American Sugar Refining Company held its controlling position 
in the sugar refining industry, sending a clear message to other industries that such extremely 
profitable combinations could avoid prosecution in the United States for the time being. 
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 In order for any monopoly to maintain its profits, it must solve the problem of entry. New 
firms could always enter the industry, refuse to cooperate, and steal the old monopoly’s 
customers by setting its price slightly lower than the old price.  The American Sugar Refining 
Company had several ingenious methods to solve this entry problem.  Again, none of these 
measures involved a protective tariff.   First, the American Sugar Refining Company (ASRC) 
made an “arrangement with the wholesale grocers under which the latter refused to handle the 
sugars of any proscribed company.”106  It would have thus been very difficult for any new 
refiners who refused to join the monopoly to market their product.  The ASRC also secured an 
exclusive deal with railroad companies in the form of the receipt of rebates and other 
concessions from the railroads, which provided the American with a substantial advantage in 
shipping costs.”107 Similarly, this measure effective deterred entry since any new refiner would 
find itself at a significant disadvantage.  The fact that the ASRC took these steps to deter new 
companies from entering the refined sugar market demonstrates what a weak factor the tariff 
really was.  Because the protective tariff was insufficient to protect trusts from new domestic 
competition, trusts erected these kinds of significant entry barriers. 
The American Sugar Refining Company became Domino Sugar in 1900.  Until 
approximately the 1930s, the company restricted production successfully, raising the price of 
refined sugar and bringing considerable wealth to the monopoly’s architects.  The sugar 
monopoly aroused public interest and reaped such enormous profits perhaps because “sugar had 
become an important part of daily consumption.”108  Many noticed that the sugar monopoly, 
once formed, could set its prices even higher than the American market permitted because 
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domestic sugar benefited from a protective tariff.  However, the ASRC’s architects designed 
their combination to restrict domestic competition; sugar consolidation was not simply a natural 
consequence of tariff protection. 
 On the other hand, the Sugar Trust supported the passage of the McKinley Tariff Act, 
because industries leaders believed that increased protective tariffs on refined sugar could restrict 
international competition and allow the trust to raise prices.  The McKinley Tariff Act enacted 
two important changes for the sugar industry: it eliminated the tariff on imported raw sugar and 
increased the tariff on imported refined sugar.109  This allowed the Sugar Trust to import its 
major input duty-free while excluding foreign competition in refined sugar.   
Thus, this change to the tariff schedule was doubly helpful to the American Sugar 
Refining Company, and this was public knowledge.  The New York Times reported how “the 
sugar men” arrived in Washington during the debate on the McKinley Tariff, and how once 
legislators heard the arguments of these “sugar men,” “the schedule was changed, and the Trust’s 
duty of one-sixth of a cent was raised to four-tenths of a cent.”110  The Times also called the 
McKinley Tariff a “bill that the Sugar Trust magnates have had molded to their own satisfaction 
and profit.”111  Moreover, John E. Searles, Treasurer of the American Sugar Refining Company, 
stated publicly that he “has no doubt that the effect of the McKinley Tariff bill will largely 
increase the business of the Sugar Trust.”112  Therefore, the event study should show some 
positive effect from the passage of the McKinley Tariff Act, though it is possible that the “sugar 
men” expected the actual passage of the bill early in the process. 
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5.0  A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LEAD INDUSTRY 
The melting, smelting, and manufacture of lead and lead products in the Americas   
predates the founding of the United States.   As early as 1621, settlers mined for lead in Falling 
Creek, Virginia.113  However, before the nineteenth century, Americans in the lead industry 
produced on a very small scale, and one of the most important lead products, white lead, did not 
even come into prominence in the industry until the middle of the nineteenth century.  By the end 
of the nineteenth century, the National Lead Trust, which later became the National Lead 
Company, led production in several lead products but especially dominated the market for white 
lead, an important ingredient for paint production.  The history of the National Lead Company in 
many ways parallels that of the American Sugar Refining Company.  Both companies enjoyed 
significant tariff protection and concentrated their industries at the end of the nineteenth 
centuries.  Journalists also theorized that the Lead Trust should benefit from the passage of the 
McKinley Tariff Act. 
Henry P. Thompson, president of the National Lead Company, commented in 1895 that 
before 1795 “minor workings in the Eastern States, while they produced but a comparatively 
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small output, were the only real American interests” in lead.114  According to Thompson’s 
nineteenth century essay from One Hundred Years of American Commerce, the manufacturing of 
silver was the major stimulus to the American lead industry early in the nineteenth century, since 
“Western lead ores were, almost without exception, very rich in silver.”115  
However, as president of the National Lead Company, he emphasizes that “the chief of 
all the products of lead manufacture is…the carbonate, which is…the white lead of today,” and 
this is used “as a pigment and base for colors.”116  White lead is the chemical compound 
(PbCO3)2·Pb(OH)2.  The substance has an opaque, white appearance and is thus a good pigment 
base for paint.  According to Thompson, white lead became popular after the Revolutionary War, 
when “more luxurious customs and greater pretensions were indulged in by the citizens of the 
new Republic, and the use of paint became general in the cities.”117 During the Civil War, 
production of white lead slumped slightly when “the introduction of the manufactured zinc oxide 
as a substitute for white lead, together with the advance in the price of metallic lead under the 
strong influence of the wartime demand, checked the use of the manufactured product until the 
return of better times at the conclusion of the war.”118  Like the sugar industry, after the Civil 
War, harsh competition characterized the lead industry, and industry leaders desperately 
searched for a solution to such ruinous competition. 
Thompson’s article, in fact, bluntly describes the consolidation of the lead industry.  Soon 
after the Civil War, lead industry leaders sought solutions to the harsh competition facing the 
industry. He notes that, as “early as 1870 the tendency toward consolidation rather than 
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individual extension was already noticeable.”119  The following excerpt from his article clearly 
describes the efforts of business owners to eliminate competition for the purpose of increasing 
profits and is a particularly crisp example of late nineteenth century trust consolidation.  He 
states, 
The manufacture of white lead in former years had been very profitable, which   
 had induced the building of an unnecessarily large number of factories in different  
 sections of the country, which in turn brought on severe competition, and    
 many of the factories became unprofitable.  In order to lessen this competition   
 various devices of association were successively tried, and failed, until at    
 last, in 1887, a number of factories came together in an association practically   
 similar to the then existing Standard Oil Trust.120 
 
Though this original combination was unsuccessful, soon the leaders of the lead industry 
asked Mr. Thompson to become president of a reformulated National Lead Trust.  By 1889, the 
National Lead Trust manufactured about eighty percent of white lead, seventy percent of red 
lead, fifteen per cent of linseed-oil, ten percent of sheet-lead, nine percent of lead pipe, and sixty 
percent of lead acetate produced in the United States.121  The New York Times, however, 
repeatedly claimed that the National Lead Trust controlled as much as ninety-seven percent of 
the overall lead industry by 1890.  On January 6, 1890, one Times reported accused the trust of 
“arbitrarily raising the price of its product by 10 per cent,” commenting that “it is well known 
that the Trust includes about 97 per cent of the productive capacity of the industry.”122 Another 
article even compares the Lead Trust to the Sugar Trust, calling the Lead Trust “a more 
comprehensive ring than Sugar Trust.”123  Thus, at the time several commentators believed that 
the National Lead Trust enjoyed extensive control of the lead industry and even exercised its 
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ability to choose prices.  These writers believed that the consolidation of the Lead Trust, like the 
Sugar Trust, allowed the consolidation greater price-setting control. 
In 1891, the leaders of the National Lead Trust dissolved the company and formed a 
corporation under New Jersey law, the National Lead Company.124  The National Lead Company 
controlled not only the white lead industry but also the principal lead smelting companies.125  
National Lead became NL Industries on April 15, 1971. NL Industries still exists today as a 
conglomeration of several metals and plastics companies, including Kronos Worldwide, Inc. and 
CompX International, Inc.126  The National Lead Trust, therefore, discovered an arrangement 
that not only “saved” industry leaders from the disastrous effects of competition but also in part 
enabled the company to survive throughout the twentieth century. 
Like the sugar industry, the lead industry in the United States enjoyed a protective tariff 
for almost its entire existence, and some believed that these tariffs were an important ingredient 
to the trust’s formation.  In one pamphlet from 1900, for example, George Macbeth charges that 
there was a significant difference in the price of lead in New York and that in London and that 
“this lead combine has arisen, and is a result of the tariff on lead,” that it “could not exist without 
this tariff, and that “it is the very perfection of a trust or combine brought into existence by the 
government.”127  Thus, similar to the case of the Sugar Trust and similar to the argument of 
economists Henry Gardner and James Hagerty, Macbeth argues that the protection tariff allowed 
the Lead Trust to raise prices and take advantage of the international market for lead.  Though 
                                                 
124 Thompson, “The Lead Industry,” 440. 
125 May, “The Lead Industry in the United States,” 667. 
126 “NL Industries.” Available: www.nl-ind.com/home.nsf.  Accessed February 12, 2009. 
127 George A. Macbeth, The Lead Trust: American Lead a Pound Less in England than Here. (Pittsburg 
[sic], 1900.) 
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the lead trust actually formed as an attempt to disrupt domestic competition, the lead industry 
did, in fact, benefit from significant tariff protection. 
  Elizabeth S. May charted the history of the lead tariff in her essay on the history of the 
American lead industry.  According to May, tariff protection for the lead industry began in 1789, 
and the federal government made several changes to the tariff schedule for lead throughout the 
nineteenth century.128  Congress reduced the tariff on lead in 1846 and 1857; then raised the 
protective tariff in 1861, 1862, 1864; and then reduced the tariff again in the 1880s.129  
Throughout nineteenth century United States history, the federal government did not pursue a 
consistent policy towards tariff protection for the lead industry. 
Often, Washington changed the tariff schedule in response to protest by manufacturers in 
the East who used lead as an input, and thus wanted a reduction in the tariff, and by lead 
producers in the West, who favored greater protection of their industry.  For example, in the 
early 1880s Eastern manufacturers successfully lobbied for a reduction in the tariff on lead.130  
Even though Western lead producers convinced Congress to raise the tariff on certain products, 
including sheet lead, the producers soon encountered another challenge.131  In 1886, for the first 
time in the history of the American lead industry Mexican producers sold a significant quantity 
of lead in the United States.  Panicked domestic lead producers lobbied for an increased 
protective tariff.  Unfortunately for lead producers, the Tariff Commission in 1886 ruled that the 
Mexican ore, because it contained a greater percentage of silver ore than of lead ore, must be 
imported into the United States completely duty free since there was no regulation in existence 
                                                 
128 May, “The Lead Industry,” 663. 
129 Ibid., 664 and 665. 
130 Ibid., 666. 
131 Ibid., 666. 
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for such composite ores.132 However, the lead industry continued to lobby for a reversal of this 
decision. 
The McKinley Tariff of 1890 settled the Mexican ore debate in favor of United States 
lead producers.  The tariff act “enacted that on the lead content of a composite ore there should 
be a duty equivalent to the duty on lead.”133 Furthermore, reports from the New York Times 
indicate that the lead industry and especially the National Lead Trust had high hopes for the 
McKinley Tariff Act.  On March 24, 1890, before the McKinley Tariff bill had left the hands of 
the House Ways and Means Committee, the Times reported that the National Lead Trust 
convinced the committee to retain its “entire duty of 3 cents a pound on white lead.”134 Then, on 
May 28, 1890, one New York Times headline yelled, 
CARBONATE RING HAPPY: SUCCESSFUL IN SAVING PARAGRAPH IN THE 
TARIFF. A LONG DEBATE ON THE LEAD-BEARING ORE CLAUSE – A 
MILLION DOLLARS IN THE POCKET OF ONE MAN.135 
 
The House had just passed the Tariff bill, and in the House version of the bill, the National Lead 
Trust had already succeeded in convincing Congress to tax the lead-silver ore from Mexico. On 
September 14, 1890, four days after Senate passed the McKinley Tariff, the New York Times 
reported that the Lead Trust “may feel reasonably confident, therefore, that it will continue to be 
protected by a tariff wall of 3 cents a pound, or from 70 to 75 per cent. [sic] ad valorem.”136 
Therefore, because the an increase in tariff rates could protect the Lead Trust from foreign 
competition, the passage of the McKinley Tariff Act was seen as helpful for the National Lead 
Trust.  
                                                 
132 Ibid., 667. 
133 Ibid., 667. 
134 New York Times March 24, 1890. 
135 New York Times May 28, 1890 
136 New York Times September 14, 1890. 
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6.0  EVENT STUDY 
As explained in the previous chapters, Sugar and Lead Trust executives as well as 
newspaper writers believed that the McKinley Tariff would increase the profits in the American 
lead and sugar industries.  One way to test the effects of such a piece of legislation and whether 
the passage of the bill was anticipated by shareholders is to perform an event study on the market 
returns of each company.   
Event studies measure changes in the value of an asset, in this case stock prices, to an 
announcement, or event.  In the case of stock prices, an event study measures whether a 
company listed on the stock exchange experiences unusually large or small returns relative to a 
control group, called the market portfolio.  Often, these studies are used to evaluate mergers or 
other corporate announcements.  Under the assumptions of the efficient-markets hypothesis they 
may also be used to study the effects of a regulatory event like the passage of the McKinley 
Tariff Act.137  This study in particular will test the null hypothesis that the Sugar and Lead Trusts 
did not experience abnormal returns for the passage of the McKinley Tariff Act against the 
alternative hypothesis that there were, in fact, some abnormal returns. 
                                                 
137 G. William Schwert. “Using Financial Data to Measure the Effects of Regulation.” (Journal of Law and 
Economics, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1981), 121. 
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6.1 METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
As a first test, I will first estimate the returns of the stock prices for the National Lead 
Trust and the Sugar Trust two months138 before the announcement of the tariff bill and two 
months after the bill signed by the president (the “out-of-sample window”) using the following 
:standard model   
ܴ௜௧ ൌ ܽ௜ ൅ ܾ௜ܴ௠ ൅ ,   ሼݐ ൏ 38ሽ ڂ  ሼݐ ൐ 176ሽ    
139
௧ ݁௜௧  
where we have ܴ௜௧ ൌ
௣೔೟ି௣೔,೟షభ
௣೔,೟షభ
, 
and where ݌௜௧ is the closing price of company i’s stock at time t.  
The source for this stock price data was New York Stock Exchange quotes from the New 
York Times.140 From the standpoint of the data available, the Sugar Trust and the Lead Trust are 
ideal companies to study because each company is listed every day on the New York Stock 
Exchange.  Furthermore, though a significant market for industrial securities did not develop 
until approximately the turn of the twentieth century, Thomas Navin and Marian Sears note that 
“the first industrial companies to attract on a large scale the attention of the investing public were 
to be found not in manufacturing or distribution but in processing (oil refining, sugar refining, 
lead smelting, and the like).”141 Thus, the lead smelting and sugar refining trusts are ideal trusts 
to study for this particular event window. 
                                                 
138 Usually, one month of observations before and after the event is considered sufficient, but especially 
given the complexity and number of events (see Table 1), two months of data points on both sides of the event will 
provide better information about conditions in the sugar and lead industries outside of the event window. 
139 John J. Binder.  “Measuring the Effects of Regulation with Stock Price Data. (The RAND Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 16 No. 2, Summer 1985), 170. 
140 The prices used in this study are the closing prices from the New York Stock Exchange.  During this 
period, the symbol for the Sugar Trust (and later American Sugar Refining Company) was “Sugar Ref. Company,” 
and that for the National Lead Trust was “Nat. Lead Trust.” 
141 Thomas R. Navin and Marian V. Sears. “The Rise of a Market for Industrial Securities, 1887-1902.” 
(The Business History Review, Vol. 29, No. 2, 1955), 112.  For more information on the condition of United States 
 40 
The market returns are the returns on a portfolio of companies from the New York Stock 
Exchange, specifically the 12 Stock Average compiled by Dow Jones.142  These companies, 
mostly railroads and other transportation services, should not experience any effects from the 
passage of the tariff act.143 Thus, this group of twelve stocks serves as an adequate control group 
for the effects of the tariff’s passage. A complete list of stocks in this portfolio appears in 
Appendix A. 
 To determine the effect of events along the passage of the McKinley Tariff Act, I will 
measure the abnormal return ܣܴ௜௧ ൌ ܴ௜௧ െ ሺܽ௜ ൅ ܾ௜ܴ௠௧ሻ, where ܴ௜௧ is company i’s actual return 
at time t and ܽ௜ ൅ ܾ௜ܴ௠௧ the predicted return for company i for all days t. 
Both the National Lead Trust and the Sugar Trust reacted to events related to the passage 
of the tariff act as well as to events that only affected each company individually.  In the case of 
the Sugar Trust, these company-specific events represent key dates in the history of the 
company.   
On April 16, 1890, William McKinley, Chairman of the House Ways and Means 
Committee, officially reported the bill that became known as the McKinley Tariff bill to the 
House of Representatives (MCREPORT).  General debate on the bill in the House of 
Representatives lasted from May 7 to May 10, 1890 (DEBATE), and the House finally passed 
                                                                                                                                                             
financial institutions before the turn of the century, see: Gene Smiley. “The Expansion of the New York Securities 
Market at the Turn of the Century.” (The Business History Review, Vol. 55, No. 1, 1981)  and Larry Neal. “Trust 
Companies and Financial Innovations, 1897-1914.” (The Business History Review, Vol. 45, No. 1, 1971). 
142 Pierce S. Phyllis, Ed. The Dow Jones Averages: 1885-1985: Centennial Edition. Dow Jones-Irwin, 
1986. The 12 Stock Average predates the Dow Jones Industria v el A erag . 
143 According to Peter Turfano, many of these railroads experienced significant financial distress in the 
second half of the nineteenth century.  Fortunately, estimating ܴ௜௧ ൌ ܽ௜ ൅ ܾ௜ܴ௠௧ ൅ ݁௜௧ both before and after the 
beginning of the event window controls for this difference in distress between the sugar and lead trusts and the 
market portfolio.  See: Peter Turfano. “Business Failure, Judicial Intervention, and Financial Intervention: 
Restructuring U.S. Railroads in the Nineteenth Century.” (The Business History Review, Vol. 71, No. 1, 1997)  for 
more details on distress in the railroad industry. 
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the bill on May 21 (HOUSEPASS).  The Senate passed the bill on September 10, 1890 
(SENATEPASS).  President Cleveland signed the bill into law on October 1, 1890 (SIGNED).144 
Several dates within the event window may have corresponded to a significant drop in 
stock price for the Sugar Price.  On March 15, 1890, the New York Times reported that 
stockholders discovered that the Sugar Trust carried a large outstanding debt, resulting in a drop 
in the stock price of the Sugar Trust (DEBTFOUND).145 On April 4, 1890, the Sugar Trust 
completed a deal for railroad rebates with the Erie Dispatch Company (RAILROAD).146 Sugar 
Trust executives made a special trip to Washington to lobby for the passage of the tariff bill on 
April 18, 1890 (LOBBY).  Most significantly, the Sugar Trust faced a significant legal battle 
during the month of June.  Several times, the Sugar Trust’s stock price fell significantly on 
rumors that the trust would be ruled illegal in the state of New York (NRRUMOR1, 
NRRUMOR2) in the North River Refining Case.  At the end of the month, in fact, the judge in 
the North River Refining Case ruled the trust illegal (NRRULING), but the trust quickly 
rebounded and reorganized as a corporation, the American Sugar Refining Company, under New 
Jersey Law (NEWJERSEY). 
The Lead Trust experienced a few events that may have affected its stock within the 
event window.  First, on March 22, 1890, the New York Times reported that the Lead Trust saved 
a three cent per pound duty on finished products in the tariff bill (KEEPDUTY).  Next, on May 
28, the trust successfully convinced Congress to maintain an especially helpful paragraph in the 
tariff schedule (KEEPPARAGRAPH). 
                                                 
144 Dates are from Edward Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies of the Nineteenth Century, 1903. 
145 “Sugar Trust Woes: Wall-Street’s Discovery of a Heavy Floating Debt,” New York Times, March 15, 
1890. 
146 New York Times, April 4, 1890. 
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Table 1 summarizes the events for the Sugar Trust, Lead Trust, and the McKinley Tariff 
Act, which should affect both companies.  Since I collected stock quotes daily, I have also listed 
the day number as well as the date for easy reference.   
Table 1: Significant Events for Sugar and Lead 
Sugar Trust Events Day Number  
DEBTFOUND 13 Significant outstanding debt discovered (March 15, 1890)
RAILROAD 36 Strikes rebate deal with Erie Dispatch Company (April 4, 
1890) 
LOBBY 40 In Washington to lobby for the tariff (April 18, 1890) 
NRRUMOR1 79 Stocks plummet on rumor of a ruling in the North River 
Case (June 4, 1890) 
NRRUMOR2 94 More North River Case rumors (June 22, 1890)  
NRRULING 96 Trust ruled illegal in North River Refining Case (June 25, 
1890) 
LETTER 111 Issues reassuring letter to certificate holders (July 16, 
1890) 
NEWJERSEY 112 Trust to reorganize as New Jersey Corporation (July 17, 
1890) 
Lead Trust Events   
KEEPDUTY 19 Lead Trust said to retain 3 cent/lb duty (March 22, 1890) 
KEEPPARAGRAPH 74 Lead Trust saves helpful paragraph in the Tariff Bill 
(May 28, 1890) 
Regulatory Events   
MCREPORT 38 McKinley, chairman of the Committee on Ways and 
Means, reports the tariff bill (April 16, 1890) 
DEBATE 56-59 General debate on the McKinley Tariff bill (May 7-10, 
1890) 
HOUESEPASS 68 McKinley Tariff is passed by the House of 
Representatives (May 21, 1890) 
SENATEPASS 160 McKinley Tariff is passed by the Senate (September 10, 
1890) 
SIGNED 176 McKinley Tariff is signed by the President (October 1, 
1890) 
Day Number shows the ordinal number of the stock quote, starting with March 1, 1890 and 
proceeding Monday through Saturday (except holidays) until November 29, 1890. 
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6.2 RESULTS 
Both the Sugar Trust and the Lead Trust show evidence of abnormal returns throughout 
the event window, as shown in Figures 1 and 2. Thus, there is evidence that the Sugar and Lead 
Trusts experienced beneficial effects from the passage of the McKinley Tariff Act.   
On the other hand, close examination of those graphs reveals a few dramatic decreases, 
especially for the Sugar Trust.  Many of these effects can be explained by the company-specific 
events listed in Table 1.  For example, on Figure 1, there is a dramatic decrease in the 
Cumulative Abnormal Return for Sugar between approximately days 60 and 80.  Meanwhile, on 
day 79, the Sugar Trust’s stock plummeted dramatically in response to rumors that the trust 
would be ruled illegal in the North River Case (NRRUMOR1).  Later, between days 80 and 100, 
the cumulative abnormal return plummets again in response to more events related to the North 
River Case (NRRUMOR2, NRRULING).   In the case of the Lead Trust, there is a small positive 
spike in the cumulative abnormal return corresponding to day 74 (KEEPPARAGRAPH), when 
the Lead Trust was able to secure a beneficial paragraph in the Tariff Bill. 
Several dates related to the passage of the McKinley Tariff Bill show dramatic responses 
in the graphs of the cumulative abnormal returns for both companies.  Both companies show 
dramatic positive spikes close to day 68 (HOUSEPASS) and strong upward progressions through 
SENATEPASS and SIGNED.   Thus, the cumulative abnormal returns for the Sugar Trust and 
the Lead Trust for the event window can be explained by the events for each specific company in 
combination with the events for the passage of the McKinley Tariff Act listed in Table 1. 
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 Figure 1: Cumulative Abnormal Return for Sugar 
 
Figure 2: Cumulative Abnormal Return for Lead 
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One way to test the significance of these events is to examine each company’s residuals 
݁௜௧ for the regression ܴ௜௧ ൌ ܽ௜ ൅ ܾ௜ܴ௠௧ ൅ ݁௜௧.  To test these deviations for significance, one can 
calculate studentized and standardized residuals.147  As shown below, the standardized and 
studentized residuals in this case are very similar, where the standardized residual is given by 
ݎ௜ ൌ
௘೔
௦೔כ
,  ݏ௜כ is an estimate of the variance of ݁௜, and ݎ௜~ܰሺ0,1ሻ. 
Table 2: Results for the Sugar Trust 
Event Expec d 
Sign 
te Residual Value Studentized 
Residual 
Standardized 
Residual 
DEBTFOUND െ -0.00854 -0.30949 -0.31117
RAILROAD ൅ -0.00022 -0.00794 -0.00799
LOBBY ൅ 0.026208 0.95408 0.95459
NRRUMOR1 െ 0.051515 1.905399* 1.876247*
NRRUMOR2 െ -0.05885 -2.19154** -2.14356**
NRRULING െ -0.03499 -1.28169 -1.27682
LETTER ൅ -0.01095 -0.39693 -0.39894
NEWJERSEY ൅ 0.003071 0.111185 0.111844
MCREPORT ൅ 0.013195 0.478403 0.480614
DEBATE ൅ 0.039451 1.447827 1.438472
HOUESEPASS ൅ -0.01309 -0.47501 -0.47722
SENATEPASS ൅ 0.010114 0.367343 0.369249
SIGNED ൅ -0.00803 -0.29119 -0.29279
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
 
Table 3: Results for the National Lead Trust 
Event Expec d 
Sign 
te Residual Value Studentized 
Residual 
Standardized 
Residual 
KEEPDUTY ൅ -0.00049 -0.02756 -0.02773
KEEPPARAGRAPH ൅ -0.00049 -0.02756 -0.02773
MCREPORT ൅ 0.011478 0.644724 0.646978
DEBATE ൅ 0.039673 2.294725** 2.238588**
HOUESEPASS ൅ -0.01297 -0.72983 -0.73187
SENATEPASS ൅ 0.011056 0.622395 0.624677
SIGNED ൅ -0.00804 -0.45115 -0.4533
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
                                                 
147 Robin A. Prager. “The Effects of Horizontal Mergers on Competition: The Case of the Northern 
Securities Company. (The RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 23 No. 1, Spring 1992), 127. 
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 Tables 2 and 3 report the significance results for the residuals for the National Lead Trust 
and the American Sugar Refining Company.  For the American Sugar Refining Company, the 
residuals for the events DEBTFOUND, LOBBY, NRRUMOR2, NRRULING, NEWJERSEY, 
MCREPORT, DEBATE, and SENATEPASS have expected signs, but only NRRUMOR2 is 
significant at the 5% level.  NRRUMOR1, surprisingly, shows a positive and significant sign. 
For the National Lead Trust, only MCREPORT, DEBATE, and SENATEPASS have 
expected signs, but DEBATE is significant at the 5% level.  For the Lead Trust, perhaps, the 
unexpected victory in the passage of the McKinley Tariff Act came during debate in the House 
of Representatives.  By the time the House actually voted on the bill, lead trust executives 
anticipated a positive outcome. 
6.3 CONCLUSIONS 
This event study demonstrates how both the Sugar Trust and the Lead trust derived 
excess returns from events related to the passage of the McKinley Tariff Act.  Figures 1 and 2 
show the cumulative abnormal returns for each company during the event window.  Tables 2 and 
3, however, show the standardized and studentized residuals for the regression, and from these 
results it appears that both companies largely anticipated that the bill would be passed.   
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7.0  CONCLUSION 
 When studying the Gilded Age in United States history, economists and historians have 
devoted significant but separate attention to the issues of tariff protection and industry 
consolidation.  At the end of the nineteenth century, however, some economists and political 
parties believed that tariff protection, by shielding large consolidations from foreign competition, 
strengthened or encouraged powerful trusts.  The Democratic Party believed that protective 
tariffs favored certain Eastern industrial interests like trusts and thus opposed tariff protection on 
democratic principle.  Some economists believed that tariffs allowed trusts to raise prices to the 
detriment of the consumer. 
 The cases of the Sugar and Lead Trusts, however, show how industry leaders formed 
consolidations not because of tariff protection but instead out of a conscious desire to eliminate 
“ruinous” domestic competition.  Consolidation agreements, not the tariff, were the mothers of 
trusts.  Trusts, on the other hand, did benefit from tariff protection once their consolidations 
formed just like any domestic industry protected by such import duties.  The McKinley Tariff 
Act changed the tariff schedule to benefit both the sugar and lead industries as a whole. Thus, 
event studies show that the sugar and lead industries derived some abnormal returns during the 
event window for events related to the passage of the McKinley Tariff Act.   
The effect of these protective tariffs on producers overseas represents a promising avenue 
for future research.  A study of how international competitors in the sugar and lead industries 
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reacted to changes in the American tariff schedule should provide direct historical evidence for 
how protective tariffs affected American industry consolidation.   Meanwhile, the debate over 
tariff protection has reemerged as politicians demand greater protection for American industries 
in the current difficult economic climate. 148  It may, therefore, also be useful to study the effects 
of tariff protection on industrial organization using more contemporary examples or by 
construction of a model contrasting the effects of domestic and foreign competition for emerging 
monopolies. 
A full exploration of the connection between tariffs and trusts during the nineteenth 
century required an interdisciplinary perspective.   To understand why politicians, economists, 
and journalists linked tariffs and industry consolidation in the period, it was necessary to explore 
primary as well as secondary historical sources.  Measuring the actual impact of protective tariffs 
on some of these industries, however, required formulating and testing hypotheses based in 
economic theory.  Thus, methodology from both economics and history proved useful in this 
study. 
                                                 
148 Paul Krugman. “Protectionism and stimulus (wonkish).” New York Times. February 1, 2009. 
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APPENDIX A 
COMPANIES IN THE 12 STOCK AVERAGE MARKET PORTFOLIO 
Chic. Milwaukee & St. Paul 
Chicago North Western 
Delaware & Hudson Canal 
Del., Lackawanna & Wanna 
Lake Shore Railroad 
Louisville & Nashville 
Missouri Pacific 
Northern Pacific pfd 
New York Central 
Union Pacific 
Pacific Mail Steamship 
Western Union 
 
Source: Pierce S. Phyllis, Ed. The Dow Jones Averages: 1885-1985: Centennial Edition.  
Homewood, IL: Dow Jones-Irwin, 1986. 
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APPENDIX B 
MARKET SHARE OF THE AMERICAN SUGAR REFINING COMPANY 
Table 4: ASRC Market Share 
Date Market Share 
1890 67.7 
1891 65.2 
1892 91.0 
1893 85.7 
1894 77.0 
1895 76.6 
1896 77.0 
 
 
 
 
Source: David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullian.  “Testing Static Oligopoly Models: Conduct 
and Cost in the Sugar Industry, 1890-1914.” The RAND Journal of Economics. Vol. 29 No. 2, 
1998, 368.  
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